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I. INTRODUCTION
INCE THE LAUNCH of the first artificial satellite in
1957, outer space has held a great deal of promise for
mankind. From new medicines to bold scientific discover-
ies, the possibilities seemed limitless. Recently, however,
the promise of space has become a large question mark.
This change in attitude is largely due to fears associated
with orbital space debris.
While the orbital debris population has not grown large
enough to prevent the exploration of outer space, some
fear that, if the situation remains unchecked, mankind will
no longer be free to venture into orbit.1 Even if the situa-
tion does not deteriorate to that point, the current debris
population is large enough to cause serious operational
problems to various missions. For example, since the incep-
tion of the U.S. space shuttle program, National Aeronautic
and Space Administration officials have had to replace at
least twenty-seven windows on various orbiters due to dam-
' The Big 'Landfill' In the Sky, CHRiSTA Sci. MONITOR, Oct. 31, 1990, at 20.
age caused by minute debris particles. 2 In addition, differ-
ent shuttle missions have been forced to alter their courses,
sometimes quite dramatically, to avoid collisions with larger
space debris objects.'
This Comment addresses several important aspects of the
problem of space debris. First, it provides an overview of
the space debris problem, including the origins of debris
and the specific risks associated with space debris. Second,
the Comment examines current international law provi-
sions governing space debris, followed by a survey of indi-
vidual countries' policies regarding debris. Finally, it
explores some of the proposed solutions and provides a
recommendation.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM
A. AMouNr OF DEBRIS
At first glance, space debris would appear to pose little or
no danger to missions in orbit. After all, outer space is a
large area, and the objects mankind has launched are small
in comparison. As is often the case, however, appearances
can be deceiving. Space debris poses a very serious threat
to human activities in outer space.4 Although mankind
only ventured into outer space thirty years ago, we have
launched approximately 18,000 objects into space since
that time.5 While not all of these objects have remained in
orbit, there are currently approximately 7100 objects in or-
bit capable of being tracked from Earth.6 Trackable ob-
jects, however, are not the greatest hazard because they
often can be avoided by utilizing the maneuvering capabili-
ties of satellites. Untrackable objects represent the most se-
rious threat to space activities. Estimates of the current
2 Miles O'Brien, Space Debris Tests Run to Find Impact on Space Gear, C.N.N. ScI. &
TECH. WEEK, Jan. 9, 1993, at Transcript #149-1.
3 Endeavor Mission Boosts Spacelab, FUGHT INT'L, July 7, 1993, at 19.
4 HowARD A. BAKER, SPACE DEBRIS: LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 1 (1989).
James P. Lampertius, The Need for an Effective Liability Regime for Damage Caused by
Debris in Outer Space, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 447, 449 (1992).
6 Id. Trackable objects include those with a diameter of at least 20 centimeters.
Id. Smaller objects are not within the visibility limits of current radar. Id.
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untrackable debris population range up to 3,500,000 ob-
jects.7 An additional danger posed by space debris is the
more than forty-eight active or inactive satellites which carry
over a ton of highly radioactive material in orbit around the
planet.8
B. TYPES OF DEBRIS
The obvious question is: where did all of this space junk
come from? The common perception is that space debris is
merely a collection of old satellites in orbit. This, however,
is not the case. Generally, space debris falls into four iden-
tifiable categories, which include inactive payloads, opera-
tional debris, fragmentation debris, and microparticulate
matter.9 Inactive satellites represent twenty-three percent
of the debris being tracked; burned out rocket stages repre-
sent ten percent; fragments constitute sixty-two percent;
and active satellites make up the remaining five percent of
trackable objects.10
Inactive payloads include formerly active satellites no
longer controlled by their operators." This category en-
compasses more than 1000 satellites or payloads in orbit at
various altitudes around the Earth.1 2 In addition, this cate-
gory represents a long-term threat to orbital activities be-
cause these satellites have an orbital lifetime of several
hundred years.13
Vladimir Kopal, The Need for International Law Protection of Outer Space Environment
Against Pollution of Any Kind, Particularly Against Space Debris, PROC. 32D COLLOQUIUM
L. OUTER SPACE 107, 116 n.2 (1989) (citing INTERAGENCY GROUP (SPACE) REPORT ON
ORBITAL DEBRIS 1 (Feb. 1989) [hereinafter INTERAGENCY REPORT]). This estimate
includes mostly very small fragments between 0.1 cm and 1 cm in size and approxi-
mately 17,500 fragments larger than a pea and smaller than a baseball. INTERAGENCY
REPORT, supra, at 4.
a NICHOLAS L. JOHNSON & DARREN S. McKNIGHT, ARTIFICIAL SPACE DEBRIS 90-91
(1987).
9 BAKER, supra note 4, at 3.
10 Kopal, supra note 7, at 110.
I BAKER, supra note 4, at 4.
12 Id.
Is Malcolm G. Wolfe, Orbital Debris-Current Issues as They Impact on an Expanding
Manned Presence in Space, PROC. 28TH COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 260, 261-63
(1985). The orbital lifetime of an object is determined by its orbital period, which is
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Operational debris is closely associated with inactive pay-
loads. This category includes objects used in various space
activities that, for a variety of reasons, remain in orbit.14
Although the launch of space vehicles produces most of the
operational debris (such as rocket stages, motors, or nose
cones), mankind has left behind a variety of material.15
Fragmentation debris is by far the largest source of man-
made space debris. 16 This type of debris is a product of ex-
plosions, collisions, or other accidents. 7 Explosions can be
either deliberate or accidental, with most deliberate explo-
sions resulting from military tests and most accidental ones
stemming from propulsion failures.1 8  Collision debris is
very problematic because it is produced in larger quantities,
travels at greater speeds, and is generally too small to be
tracked.' 9
The final category of debris is microparticulate matter.
As the name suggests, these are very minute particles depos-
ited in orbit by various means. The sources of micropar-
ticulate matter include solid-propellant rocket motors,
coatings and materials of spacecraft (such as paint or bind-
ing agents), and miscellaneous other sources. °
how long it takes to complete one circuit around the Earth. Id. Objects with longer
orbital periods will remain in space for much greater periods of time and thus pose
a long-term threat. Id.
14 BAKER, supra note 4, at 4.
5 Id. Other examples of operational debris include orbital transfer vehicles, re-
straining bolts, straps, clamps, staging mechanisms, fuel tanks, window covers,
screws, gloves, dirty clothes, food wrappers, and frozen sewage. Id.
16 Captain Bruce L. McDermott, Outer Space: The Latest Polluted Frontier, 36 A.F. L.
REv. 143, 145 (1992). One hundred identified satellite breakups are responsible for
49% of all catalogued objects in orbit. BAKER, supra note 4, at 5.
17 BAKER, supra note 4, at 4.
18 Id. at 5. Anti-satellite tests of the United States and the former Soviet Union
contributed to the problem of space debris, as did deliberate destructions of satel-
lites to prevent uncontrolled re-entry or recovery by a competing state. Id. See also
JOHNSON & McKNIGHT, supra note 8, at 13 (stating that 34 satellite breakups had
been the result of intentional acts as of 1986). A typical explosion generates 200
detectable pieces of debris and possibly 1000 undetectable ones. McDermott, supra
note 16, at 144 n.5.
1g BAKER, supra note 4, at 7.
- Id. at 8-9. Estimates of the amount of microparticulate matter range from 10
billion to thousands of trillions of parts. Id. at 8.
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C. RISKS OF SPACE DEBRIS
1. Damage Caused By Space Debris
Numerous factors beyond the type of debris are relevant
to assessing the potential harmful effects of debris.21 The
primary reason debris poses any risk at all, however, is the
fact that objects in orbit travel at incredibly high speeds.
While individual velocities vary, orbital debris usually travels
almost ten times faster than a rifle bullet.2 2 When objects
are travelling at that velocity, small size does not translate
into minimal damage. In fact "[a] 3 mm piece of space
debris travelling at 10 km/sec. has as much kinetic energy
as a 12 lb bowling ball travelling at 60 mph."2 3 Given the
relatively fragile construction of most orbital objects, the
potential for damage is considerable.
2. Probability of Collisions With Space Debris
While the speed of objects is relevant to the amount of
damage the objects might cause, the size of the debris is an
important factor in determining the probability of collision
with another space object because of the sheer number of
objects in orbit. Obviously, the larger objects have the po-
tential to cause much greater damage.2 4 Even eight years
ago, experts estimated that the collision frequency was be-
tween 0.24 and 1 collision per year, with the first significant
collision predicted to occur sometime between 1989 and
2005.25
Another factor impacting the probability and nature of
collisions is the altitude at which objects orbit. Low Earth
"I These include the size of the objects in orbit, the altitudes at which they travel,
their speeds, and the lengths of time the objects are in orbit. Gunnar Leinberg,
Orbital Space Debris, 4J.L. & TECH. 93, 98 (1989).
Philip J. Hilts & Boyce Rensberger, Science Notebook-Cleaning Up Space, WAsH.
PosT, Sept. 26, 1988, at Al.
'2 Leinberg, supra note 21, at 98.
24 See BAKER, supra note 4, at 10 tbl. 1 (comparing size of debris, nature of threat
posed, and probability of threat occurring).
25 F. Kenneth Schwetje, Current U.S. Initiatives to Control Space Debris, PROC. 30TH
COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 163, 164 (1987). This estimate was based only on the
tracked debris population and did not include untrackable debris.
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Orbit (LEO), which stretches from approximately 200 km
to 4000 km above the Earth, offers some of the best oppor-
tunities for scientific, commercial, and public uses, yet deb-
ris already crowds this area.26 Because manned missions,
including the proposed space station, use this orbit, the
chance of collisions with debris is a serious hazard. 27
Geostationary Orbit (GEO) is also a very important orbit
threatened by space debris. GEO is a geosynchronous orbit
that allows objects to maintain an essentially stationary orbit
over a particular area of the planet and, therefore, allows
ground based tracking systems to remain in continuous
contact without constant realignment. GEO is a limited re-
source of vital importance because only a limited number
of orbital slots are available. All of the civil telecommunica-
tion satellites are in GEO, along with many meteorological,
broadcasting, data relay, tracking, and remote sensing satel-
lites. 8 The primary problems with debris generation in
GEO are the limited number of available slots and the fact
that, in GEO, objects that are not removed can have orbital
lifetimes nearing ten million years.29  Geosynchronous
Transfer Orbit (GTO) is used primarily for objects passing
into GEO from LEO. Because the orbital pattern is not uni-
form, objects left behind in GTO can have lifetimes ranging
from a few months to many years."0
One of the most serious dangers posed by debris, and
also one of the greatest theoretical dangers, is the "cascade
effect."31 The cascade effect is "a process by which space
26 See BAKER, supra note 4, at 23. Activities currently occurring in LEO include
research, telecommunications satellites, storage orbits, and manned activities, in-
cluding space stations. Id.
- See Barbara Wood-Kaczmar, Junkyard in the Sky, NEw SCIENTIST, OCt. 13, 1986, at
38 (discussing the space station Freedom and the potential for life threatening en-
counters with space debris); see also Leinberg, supra note 21, at 99 (estimating that
during the 17 year lifetime of the proposed space station, there is a 50% chance of it
being struck by debris and a 1% chance of it being destroyed).
" Baker, supra note 4, at 25.
Id. at 26.
- Id. at 24.
3A McDermott, supra note 16, at 146; BKaR, supra note 4, at 13. The cascade
effect is also sometimes known as the "Kessler Syndrome." William B. Wirin, Space
Debris 1989, PROC. 32D COLLOQUIM L. OUTER SPACE 184, 189 (1989).
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debris will become self-generating and therefore uncontrol-
lable."3 2 The more space objects there are in orbit, the
greater the probability that there will be a collision. With
each new collision, there is a corresponding increase in the
amount of debris, which would then result in an even
greater probability of collisions.3 3 Some experts state that,
even if mankind launched no new objects into orbit, the
debris population would continue to increase exponentially
and make at least parts of Earth orbit, such as LEO,
unusable.3 4 While this is still a largely theoretical problem,
simulations demonstrate the population of large space ob-
jects needed to begin such a chain-reaction is only two to
three times the current number of objects in orbit.3 5
3. Interference Caused by Space Debris
Another reason why the debris population concerns
many experts is the effect it may have on scientific, com-
mercial, 6 and military activities. Some scientists fear
space debris may impair the accuracy of scientific data re-
ceived from transmissions distorted by debris interfer-
ence. 3  Another problem with debris is that very small
debris particles can cause the "graceful degradation" of so-
lar panels and optical instruments on space objects.3 9 In
addition, debris can impact scientific activities without ever
colliding with another object. Sometimes, debris reflects
32 BAKER, supra note 4, at 13.
-5 McDermott, supra note 16, at 146.
34 BAKER, supra note 4, at 13.
s, D. Felske, The Space Debris Issue: Problems and Recommendations, PROC. 33D COLLO-
QUIM L. OUTER SPACE 417 (1990).
5 The primary concern for commercial activities is the congestion caused in GEO
by the abandonment of satellites at the end of their useful lives without boosting
them to a disposal orbit. BAKER, supra note 4, at 18.
.7 Id. at 16-17; McDermott, supra note 16, at 146.
- McDermott, supra note 16, at 146. This same effect could also interfere with
commercial satellite communications. Id.
*9 BAKER, supra note 4, at 16. Graceful degradation refers to the surface erosion of
these objects which can spoil the accuracy of data collected.
light that either ground or space-based astronomical ob-
servers later interpret to be something it is not.a°
III. DEFINING SPACE DEBRIS
A. WHAT IS A SPACE OBJECT?
One of the most frustrating difficulties associated with
the problem of space debris is that there is no agreement
on how to define space debris or what to include within the
scope of a legal definition. Although there are several in-
ternational treaties dealing with the law of outer space,
none of them define or describe what is commonly known
as space debris.'" The treaties do, however, use the term
"space object."42
The definition of space object is key to analyzing the
space debris problem. If the definition of space object in-
cludes space debris, then some international treaty provi-
sions may apply. If, however, the term space object does
not encompass space debris, parties must look to other
sources for a remedy. Unfortunately, the term space object
does not provide much insight into the space debris prob-
lem. The term has no clear definition, thus making it ex-
tremely difficult to determine precisely what debris is and
when something gains that status.43 The fact that the defi-
40 Wirin, supra note 31, at 190. For example, what were thought to be pulsars
turned out to be reflections from dead satellites' solar panels. BAKER, supra note 4,
at 17.
41 BAKER, supra note 4, at 61.
42 "Space object" is defined to include the "component parts of a space object as
well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof." Convention on International Liability
for Damage Caused by Space Objects, opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, art. I(d), 24
U.S.T. 2389 [hereinafter Liability Convention]; see also Convention on Registration
of Objects Launched into Outer Space, openedfor signatureJan. 14, 1975, art. 1(b), 28
U.S.T. 695 [hereinafter Registration Convention] (using the same language as the
Liability Convention to define "space object"). The definitions included in these
conventions appear to satisfy only the specific needs arising from the treaties. Vladi-
mir Kopal, Issues Involved in Defining Outer Space, Space Object and Space Debris, PROC.
34Tm COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE, 38, 40 (1991).
4 I.H. Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor, The Increasing Problems of Space Debris and Their
Legal Solutions, PRoc. 32D COLLOQUIUM L. OtrrER SPACE 77, 77 (1989). The drafters
of the Liability and Registration Conventions never specifically addressed whether
space debris was included under the term space object. BAKER, supra note 4, at 63.
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nition of space object includes the term 'space object'
reveals how circular the analysis in this area can become.
There are a few types of objects which clearly fall within
the meaning of space object. These include active satellites
and spacecraft. 44 It is unclear, however, whether inactive
satellites or spacecraft are within the scope of the term
space object. In addition, there is a great deal of debate
about whether an object that does not originate on Earth or
one that does not achieve orbit qualifies as a space object.45
This issue could become an important one in the future
when mankind begins assembling spacecraft in orbit.
Various commentators have proposed definitions of
space object to try to solve some of these problems. Dr.
Lukin, a Russian lawyer, defines "space object as an object
belonging to one or more states or non-governmental enti-
ties, launched into outer space or on a celestial body for
collecting and transmitting information, for transportation
and manufacturing processes, and controlled by the
ground center."46 One Czechoslovakian professor would
define space object to include all man-made instrumentali-
ties launched into outer space and moving in orbits around
the earth or on other trajectories.47
Another possible approach to defining space object is the
functional approach. This definition would define space
object as any space instrument in its "operational state."48
According to Baker, this definition would encompass space
debris, although the argument is somewhat unconvincing.
Baker's own proposal would define space object as any ob-
ject intended for launch (whether or not into orbit or be-
yond), launched (whether or not into orbit or beyond), or
assembled in space, and any instrumentality used as a
- BAKER, supra note 4, at 64.
45 Id.
46 William B. Wirin, Space Debris and Space Objects, PROc. 34TH COLLoQuIuM L.
OUTER SPACE 45, 46 (1991).
47 Kopal, supra note 42, at 40. This definition includes both launch vehicles and
payloads. Id.
- BAKER, supra note 4, at 40. This definition includes both launch vehicles and
payloads. Id.
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means of delivering any object previously described. This
definition would include any part of an object as described
above and any object on board a space object which either
intentionally or unintentionally becomes detached, ejected,
emitted, launched, or thrown from the space object at any
time.49
B. WHAT IS SPACE DEBIUS?
Once the world community agrees on a definition of
space object, it must develop a definition of space debris.
As with the term space object, there is no consensus con-
cerning the definition of space debris. In fact, many com-
mentators have tried to avoid the term "debris"
altogether. 50 Regardless of whether it is called debris, junk,
or refuse, the scope of the problem remains the same.
Therefore, because it is the most widely accepted term in
the field, this Comment will continue to refer to the orbital
objects as debris.
Space debris is most often referred to as a popular, rather
than a legal, term5' used to describe components or frag-
ments of space objects that are spent or no longer func-
tional. 2 Many consider space debris to be pieces of either
launch vehicles or satellites (active or inactive) that remain
in orbit and pose a threat to space activity.53 However, be-
cause there is no universally accepted definition of space
debris, the world community must develop one to satisfy
the requirements of international space law.
- Id. at 67.
50 See Ernst Fasan, Space Debris-A Functional Approach, PROC. 35TH COLLOQUIUM L.
OUTER SPACE 281, 282 (1992) (discussing possible use of terms such as junk, pollu-
tant, contaminant, flotsam, refuse, etc.); see also BAKER, supra note 4, at 61 (sug-
gesting the term "space refuse"); Wirin, supra note 46, at 46 (suggesting the term
"space contaminant"); Kunihiko Tatsuzawa, The Protection of Space Environment: The
Problem of Space Wreckages, PROC. 32D COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 173, 173 (1989)
(suggesting the term "space wreckage" because it is a "legal one" and it may include
scattered fragments as well as inactive or out of control satellites).
51 Fasan, supra note 50, at 282.
52 Kopal, supra note 42, at 41.
53 Wirin, supra note 46, at 45.
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Fasan would define space debris as "all artificial objects
which move in Outer Space due to the natural laws of mo-
tion and which are not under control, thus except active
satellites."5 4 Another approach would be to define space
debris as "a no longer functioning, no longer controlled,
nonuseful or abandoned space object or part of such."55 A
completely different way of defining debris would be to list
the types of objects which would be considered debris, such
as used rocket stages and separation devices. 6 A laundry
list approach, however, is limiting because new contingen-
cies invariably arise which were not considered when draft-
ing the original list. Instead of continually redefining the
list, the world community should develop a definition that
provides the flexibility to deal with new situations. The
same rationale applies to proposed definitions focusing on
the division of the term space object into several defined
categories.
It may be easier to identify what is not space debris than
to agree on what is space debris.58 Under this approach, a
functioning space object and its component parts would
clearly not be space debris if it were in its predetermined
orbit and remained under control.5 9 The European Space
Agency, in its report on space debris, apparently took this
approach by dividing man-made space objects into two cate-
gories: 1) active satellites and spacecraft that were under
control; and 2) space debris that comprises all other ob-
14 Fasan, supra note 50, at 282.
55 Stephen Gorove, Space Debris in International Legal Perspective, PROC. 32D COLLO-
QUIUM L. OUTER SPACE, 97, 97 (1989). This approach is similar to the approach
used by many international organizations which consider a space object to be debris
when it has used all of its fuel and can no longer be controlled. Leinberg, supra
note 21, at 101.
56 Oscar Fernindez-Brital, Space Debris A Form of Appropriation of Outer Space, PROC.
34TH COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 164, 165 (1991) (discussing various proposed
definitions of space debris).
57 See Kopal, supra note 42, at 41 (discussing the possibility of splitting the term
"space object" into categories of space station, space object in a narrower sense, and
space debris).
58 Id. at 42 (quoting Professor C.Q. Christol).
59 Id.
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jects, such as deactivated satellites, rocket stages, fragments,
particles, etc.60
A good definition of space debris should be able to ad-
dress the needs of current and future space operations and
must not create obstacles to the growth of activities in outer
space.6 ' In the vast majority of definitions proposed by
commentators, the common factor has been control over
the object in question. By focusing on control, one can
avoid many of the problems associated with differences in
the sizes of objects, their composition, and their origins.
Stephen Gorove's proposed definition is a good example of
the control approach, as is the approach taken by the Euro-
pean Space Agency.62 Control, however, should not be the
sole criterion to judge whether an object is or is not debris.
It is easy to imagine objects that are not under the contin-
ued control of any entity yet still serve useful purposes. For
example, a temporarily malfunctioning satellite might be
out of control for a period of time, but it should not be
considered debris if it could be repaired. Because of these
factors, a definition based on Gorove's proposal could sat-
isfy the requirement of encompassing all relevant objects
while also providing some limits.
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW PROVISIONS
A. OUTER SPACE TRFAT
Various international treaties have provisions that might
have ramifications for the problem of space debris. For the
most part, however, relevant international law only provides
general guidelines concerning behavior and does not offer
specific rules or standards regarding the production of
space debris. The first general treaty dealing with the law
of outer space was the Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
-0 Wirin, supra note 46, at 46.
61 Kopal, supra note 42, at 39.
62 See supra notes 54, 55 and accompanying text (discussing definition based on
the continued control or functioning of the object).
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Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. 63
There are several statements in this treaty which arguably
apply to space debris, but the arguments are often tenuous
at best.
1. Article I-General Principles
The first three articles of the treaty discuss, in very gen-
eral terms, activities in outer space. Article I states that the
exploration and use of outer space "shall be carried out for
the benefit and in the interests of all countries ... and shall
be the province of all mankind."6 It can be argued that the
accumulation of debris in orbit is not in the interest of all
countries and that this provision therefore should prohibit
the pollution of outer space by debris.65 Dr. Fernindez-
Brital suggests that the treaty's contemplated use is an intel-
ligent and beneficial use; leaving debris in outer space is,
accordingly, not an authorized use.66 However, no com-
mentator has seriously suggested that this provision pro-
vides a solution to the debris problem. Instead, it merely
demands generally responsible behavior from the users of
outer space.67
2. Article II-Apprcpriation Theory
Article II of the treaty allows for a more interesting argu-
ment. This article states, "[o] uter space.., is not subject to
national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of
use or occupation, or by any other means." 68 In a sense,
space debris may constitute a form of appropriation of
outer space. Because two objects cannot occupy the same
space (orbit) at the same time, placing debris in space
63 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signa-
tureJan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
64 Id. art. I.
65 Leinberg, supra note 21, at 101.
- Fernindez-Brital, supra note 56, at 166.
67 Stephan Hobe, Space Debris: A Proposal for its International Legal Regulation, PROC.
34T COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 194, 195 (1991).
" Outer Space Treaty, supra note 63, art. II.
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removes the possibility of another object using that
location.69
This approach is related to the view of outer space as a
commons. Some argue that Articles I and II of the Outer
Space Treaty provide a structure for use of outer space simi-
lar to a terrestrial commons, thus encouraging spacefaring
nations to take maximum advantage of the resource of
space in the shortest time possible. 70 As with a terrestrial
commons, the use or consumption of the resource by one
party necessarily precludes that use by another member of
the commons.
Thus, the placement of debris in orbit may in fact consti-
tute an appropriation. However, as in the case of acciden-
tal fragmentary debris, this appropriation may be entirely
out of the control of any party. In addition, if the premise
of the argument is valid, then any space object, not just
space debris, would constitute an appropriation of outer
space in violation of Article II. This clearly was not in-
tended by the drafters of the treaty.
3. Article VI and Article VII-Responsibility and Liability
The next relevant provision of the Outer Space Treaty is
Article VI, which states that party states shall bear interna-
tional responsibility for national activities in outer space, re-
gardless of whether or not those activities are conducted by
government or private entities. 71 Again, this provision of
the treaty arguably applies to space debris because it results
from states' activities in outer space. However, in terms of
prevention of debris, as opposed to responsibility for deb-
ris, the provision is not adequate. It focuses only on respon-
sibility for debris after its creation. The problem with this is
that, first, it currently is virtually impossible to identify the
60 Fem ndez-Brital, supra note 56, at 166. Dr. Fernfndez-Brital discusses how,
throughout history, the depositing of objects (such as flags) represented an accepta-
ble form of national appropriation before any consistent occupation occurred. Id.
70 Lawrence D. Roberts, Addressing the Problem of Orbital Space Debris: Combining In-
ternational Regulatory and Liability Regimes, 15 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 51, 55
(1992).
71 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 63, art. VI.
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source of any particular piece of debris and second, even if
the debris is identifiable, the party could only be held re-
sponsible for damages because removal operations are not
technologically or economically feasible at this time.72
Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty deals more specifi-
cally with liability of a state for damage to another state,
which is a party to the treaty, from the other state's space
object or its components. 73 While this might serve to deter
some states from producing debris, the provision obviously
does not prohibit the creation of space debris. The same
problems with identification and enforcement that limit the
value of Article VI also render Article VII realistically
ineffectual.
4. Article VIII-Ownership and Jurisdiction
Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty is not pertinent to
the creation of debris, but it does have implications for the
removal of debris. This provision states: "A State Party to
the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer
space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over
such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer
space or on a celestial body."74 States interested in remov-
ing debris in the future must overcome the jurisdictional
problems created if debris is included within the scope of
the term "object."75 This provision, however, has not been
closely examined due to the overriding provisions of the
Registration Convention.76
5. Article 1X-Due Regard and Harmful Contamination
Probably the most closely examined provision of the
Outer Space Treaty, in terms of space debris, has been Arti-
72 Leinberg, supra note 21, at 102; see a.o BAKER, supra note 4, at 74.
73 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 63, art. VII.
74 Id. art. VIII.
75 See supra notes 41-62 and accompanying text (discussing the definitions of
space object and space debris).
76 See infra notes 115-36 and accompanying text (discussing the Registration
Convention).
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cle IX. 77 In general, this article requires parties to the
treaty to conduct their activities in space with "due regard"
for the interests of other parties, to avoid "harmful contami-
nation" of outer space, and to consult with other states if
the activity could interfere with the activities of the other
states.78 The first sentence of Article IX requiring recogni-
tion of other states' interests could be applicable to space
debris in the sense that the generation of space debris is
not in another country's interest. 79 This argument, how-
ever, is very similar to that associated with Article I of the
Outer Space Treaty, and experts do not afford it much
credence because it does not provide concrete guidelines.8 0
The most important provisions of Article IX are the pro-
hibition on "harmful contamination" and the requirement
of consultation if activities are believed to have the poten-
tial for "harmful interference" with space activities. As with
most aspects of space debris, however, any possible effec-
tiveness of these provisions is thwarted by problems with
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 63, art. IX. Article IX reads as follows:
In the exploration and use of outer space ... States Parties to the
Treaty shall be guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual
assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space... with
due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to
the Treaty. States Parties to the Treaty shall ... avoid ... harmful
contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the
Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and,
where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose. If
a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or
experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space . . . would
cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States
Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space ... it shall
undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding
with any such activity or experiment. A State Party to the Treaty which
has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by an-
other State Party in outer space. . . would cause potentially harmful
interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of




- Leinberg, supra note 21, at 103.
8 See supra text accompanying notes 64-67 (discussing art. I of the Outer Space
Treaty); see also BAKER, supra note 4, at 96-97 (discussing limitations on "correspond-
ing interests" language of art. IX of the Outer Space Treaty).
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definitions.8 1 There is no generally accepted definition of
either "harmful contamination" or "harmful interference,"
and the treaty does not provide any guidance.8 2 One com-
mentator suggests that harmful contamination does not in-
clude space debris and refers only to astronauts and
spacecraft.a3 Another argues that, from a strict reading of
the treaty language, the prohibition on harmful contamina-
tion only extends to activities relating to the study or explo-
ration of outer space and would not apply to commercial
utilization of space.8 4
It would appear that the original intention of the drafters
of the Outer Space Treaty was not to protect directly the
outer space environment.8 5 By framing the article in the
manner they did (i.e., by not providing a definition), the
drafters allow a state to deny any contamination because
the question of what is an appropriate action is completely
within the discretion of the state.8 6 The test for "harm" is
whether the activity interferes with the future use of outer
space, not whether the outer space environment is dam-
aged.87 Article IX provides "no direct protection of the
outer space environment per se. "88
The final provision of Article IX deals with the duty of
parties to the treaty to "undertake appropriate interna-
tional consultations" before conducting any activity which
may harmfully interfere with other nations' space activi-
a' See Wirin, supra note 46, at 47-48 (discussing various commentators' suggestions
for defining harmful contamination).
82 Leihberg, supra note 21, at 103.
83 Y.M. Kolossov, Legal Aspects of Outer Space Environment Protection, PROC. 23D COL-
LOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 103, 104 (1980).
84 Roberts, supra note 70, at 56.
85 Hobe, supra note 67, at 195.
88 Id.
87 BAKER, supra note 4, at 95. Baker discusses in depth what he terms the "sci-lab
perception" which has pervaded man's exploration and use of outer space. This
perception or attitude views protection of the outer space environment as useful
only to the extent that it does not affect the interests of the various spacefaring
nations. According to Baker, this perception has had a profound influence on the
way the various treaty drafters have approached the problems of outer space law. Id.
at 87-98; see also Roberts, supra note 70, at 56 (stating that the "primary objective...
of art. IX is to maximize exploitation of the space environment").
- Hobe, supra note 67, at 195.
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ties. 9 One of the primary problems with this provision is
that, in the vast majority of situations, a state's planned ac-
tivities do not include the generation of space debris suffi-
cient to constitute harmful interference. The one
significant exception to this rule is anti-satellite testing
(ASAT), but this is no longer a serious concern due to
agreements restricting anti-satellite testing.90 The effective-
ness of this clause is extremely limited because it does not
provide a veto over any state's activities; rather, it simply re-
quires "consultations."91
Given the provisions of all of the articles of the Outer
Space Treaty, it is apparent than any prohibition on the
generation of space debris could only be found in the spirit
of the treaty and not in its text.
B. LIABILITY CONVENTION
The Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects92 (Liability Convention) was en-
acted in 1972, after the Outer Space Treaty, to elaborate on
the principles' articulated in Article VI of the Outer Space
Treaty, dealing with international responsibility for activi-
ties in space. The impetus behind the development of the
Liability Convention was concern about possible damage to
property or people on Earth, not to objects or people in
space, although the drafters addressed damage in space to a
limited extent.93 Thus, like the Outer Space Treaty, the Li-
ability Convention only addresses the problem of space
debris in an indirect manner and does not provide a solu-
tion to the situation.
Article I of the Liability Convention is a definition section
covering the terms "damage" and "space object," which are
the most important for the purpose of this analysis. As dis-
cussed previously, the term space object "includes compo-
'o Outer Space Treaty, supra note 63, art. IX.
-o Leinberg, supra note 21, at 103.
' McDermott, supra note 16, at 150.
Liability Convention, supra note 42.
0' BAKER, supra note 4, at 79.
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nent parts of a space object as well as its launch vehicle and
parts thereof."94 The convention also defines damage as
"loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of health;
or loss of or damage to property of States or of persons,
natural or juridical, or property of international intergov-
ernmental organizations."95
These two terms come into play in the two provisions of
the convention articulating when liability occurs. Article II
of the Liability Convention provides that a launching state
will be responsible for damage on the Earth's surface or to
aircraft in flight caused by its space object under a theory of
absolute liability.96 In contrast, if the damage is to a space
object or to persons or property on board a space object
anywhere other than on the surface of the Earth, then the
launching state is only liable for that damage if it is at
fault.97
The creation of a fault-based liability standard in the con-
vention leads to several problems in terms of responsibility
for damage caused by space debris.98 The most obvious
problem is identification of the debris. Generally, "[i] t is
difficult, if not impossible, to identify the owner of most
space debris."99 Only a small percentage of objects are even
capable of being tracked and, of those, a large number are
not attributable to any particular source.100 In addition, it
94 Liability Convention, supra note 42, art. I(d); see supra notes 41-62 (discussing
problems associated with the definition of "space object").
95 Liability Convention, supra note 42, art. I(a).
96 Id. art. II.
97 Id. art. III.
98 For purposes of discussing the Liability Convention, this analysis will assume
that space debris is included within the term space object because, if it were not,
then the Liability Convention would have no application in situations involving dam-
age caused by space debris. However, it should be noted that, when the Liability
Convention was being negotiated, the focus was not on the issue of liability for space
debris damage. Leinberg, supra note 21, at 104; McDermott, supra note 16, at 155.
In fact the negotiators intentionally avoided the issue for fear that the treaty would
never be completed. BAKER, supra note 4, at 79; Lampertius, supra note 5, at 454
(indicating that negotiations for the Liability Convention lasted nearly ten years).
'9 Leinberg, supra note 21, at 104.
"9 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (discussing debris population and
tracking capabilities). Trackable objects also do not present the greatest possibility
of producing damage since they can be identified and usually avoided.
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is often difficult to determine exactly what caused damage
to a space object.101 For example, "the cause of almost half
the satellite breakups cannot be discerned."112 Some may
have been simple malfunctions while others may have been
the result of debris generated by a particular state.
Problems with proof are not the only difficulties associ-
ated with Article III of the Liability Convention.1 0 3 There is
also a great deal of uncertainty about the meaning of "fault"
within the convention. Just because two objects collide, one
a piece of debris and one an active space object, it is not
automatically the "fault" of the debris. In reality, it could
be the fault of neither party. Fault, however, is not even
defined in the Liability Convention, and it carries many dif-
ferent possible interpretations. Baker suggests fault may be
either objective or subjective, although subjective fault is
probably the applicable standard since objective fault would
merely be a reiteration of state responsibility under interna-
tional law.1°4 Since international law is almost entirely con-
sensual, the objective fault view would allow a state to do
whatever it wanted unless there was a demonstrated limit-
ing rule of international law.105
This leads to the issue of the lack of a 'standard of care
required to establish fault in general. 106 This lack of an ar-
ticulated standard of care is particularly important because
of the absence of customary international law dealing with
101 Hobe, supra note 67, at 197.
-02 Lampertius, supra note 5, at 458.
10- The Liability Convention also does not state whether the damage caused must
have been reasonably foreseeable. Liability Convention, supra note 42.
104 BAKER, supra note 4, at 84. Baker states that objective fault would be based on a
pre-existing legal duty while subjective fault would be more like the law of negli-
gence. Id.
-05 Robert F. Stamps, Orbital Debris: An International Agreement is Needed, PROC. 32D
COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 152, 154 (1989).
- "Fault liability presumes that a standard of care exists by which one can judge
the reasonableness of the defendant's actions." Lampertius, supra note 5, at 456.
"Unintentional conduct is considered to be faulty only when the conduct violates
some standard of conduct." McDermott, supra note 16, at 155.
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space in general and space debris in particular. 0 7 Without
a defined standard of care, the Liability Convention is fun-
damentally flawed in terms of responsibility for space deb-
ris. A complaining state must prove that the defendant
state owed it a legal duty, that the duty was breached, and
that the breach was the proximate cause of damage."' 8 In
the great majority of cases which might arise concerning
space debris, a complaining state would have an extraordi-
narily difficult time establishing any of these three
elements.
Various commentators have proposed standards which
would provide a manner in which to assign responsibility
under a fault based system. 109 However, the better ap-
proach may be to forgo fault-based liability altogether and
move towards a strict or absolute liability standard, such as
that used in Article II of the Liability Convention. As with
most situations where strict liability is appropriate, space ac-
tivities could be considered "abnormally dangerous" or "ul-
trahazardous."11° Under strict liability, the state choosing
to engage in the activity should bear the risk of injury or
damage when no measures could prevent the damage."'
Shifting the cost from the victim to the entity that caused
the damage would force that entity to take those costs into
account when considering whether, and how, to proceed
with its space activity. Another argument in favor of apply-
ing a strict liability standard is that such an approach is use-
107 See ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECS OF ACTIVITIES IN OUTER SPACE 149-90 (Karl-Heinz
B6ckstiegel ed., 1990) (setting forth various commentators' views on customary in-
ternational law and space activities, particularly the pollution of space).
l0 Stamps, supra note 105, at 154.
log For example, Baker suggests the following standard:
A launching State would be negligent if it (1) abandoned deliberately
an active satellite where the technology existed to retrieve it; (2) failed
to maintain the required spacing between satellites in GEO; (3) failed
to place a potentially inactive satellite in a disposal orbit; (4) failed to
mitigate the production of space refuse; or (5) refused to remove
space refuse resulting from its space activities.
BAKER, supra note 4, at 84; see also Lampertius, supra note 5, at 464.
i1o BAKER, supra note 4, at 85; Lampertius, supra note 5, at 462.
I BAKER, supra note 4, at 85; see also Lampertius, supra note 5, at 462 (quoting
Baker as providing the best explanation of why absolute liability should apply).
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ful in situations where fault cannot be established.1 1 2 In
addition to the difficulties with detection and identification
of debris, it might be impossible to establish fault when two
active space objects collide, resulting in potential claimant
states bearing the losses individually.11 3 While strict liability
may be an appropriate solution, spacefaring nations are not
likely to adopt it due to opposition by some of the major
parties involved. 1 4
The various problems associated with applying the Liabil-
ity Convention make it apparent that it is insufficient to ad-
dress the issue of the pollution of the outer space
environment by space debris. Not only is it extremely diffi-
cult to apply the Liability Convention to situations of actual
damage, but it is clear that states cannot be held responsi-
ble under the convention for the mere presence of debris
in orbit. Because it is difficult to hold states liable, and be-
cause states have little to fear in terms of liability for dam-
age caused in orbit, the convention provides no incentive
for states to limit the amount of debris they generate.
Therefore, the Liability Convention, like the Outer Space
Treaty, is ineffective as a tool to regulate the proliferation
of space debris.
C. THE REGISTRATION CONVENTION AND THE RETURN AND
RESCUE AGREEMENT
On September 15, 1976, the Convention on Registration
of Objects Launched into Outer Space"15 (Registration
Convention) came into force. The drafters designed the
Registration Convention to supplement the Liability Con-
vention by aiding in the identification of space objects
launched into orbit. In addition, the Registration Conven-
tion represents an extension of the principles contained in
"' McDermott, supra note 16, at 156.
's BAKER, supra note 4, at 86.
11 Lampertius, supra note 5, at 463. When the Liability Convention was being
drafted, the then Soviet Union adamantly opposed the imposition of absolute liabil-
ity for damage which occurred in orbit. Id.
I Registration Convention, supra note 42.
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Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty regarding jurisdic-
tion and control of space objects.1 16
The Registration Convention provides: "When a space
object is launched into earth orbit or beyond, the launch-
ing State shall register the space object by means of an en-
try in an appropriate registry which it shall maintain."'
The launching states must also notify the Secretary-General
of the United Nations that they have established these regis-
tries.1 1 8 Once the launching state has entered the space ob-
ject into its own registry, it must provide certain
information about the object to the Secretary-General, who
will enter that information into a master registry.1 9
Under the Registration Convention, a state must only
comply with those provisions in identifying the objects it
launches into space.1 20 Although the Registration Conven-
116 See supra notes 74-76 (discussing art. VIII of the Outer Space Treaty).
117 Registration Convention, supra note 42, art. II(1). Each state determines the
content of its registry. Id. art. 11(3).
-1 Id. art. 11(1).
119 Id. art. III(1). Art. IV provides:
1. Each State of registry shall furnish to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, as soon as practicable, the following information con-
cerning each space object carried on its registry:
(a) Name of launching State or States;
(b) An appropriate designator of the space object or its registration
number;
(c) Date and territory or location of launch;





(e) General function of the space object.
2. Each State of registry may, from time to time, provide the Secretary-
General of the United Nations with additional information concern-
ing a space object carried on its registry.
3. Each State of registry shall notify the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, to the greatest extent feasible and as soon as practica-
ble, of space objects concerning which it has previously transmitted
information, and which have been but no longer are in earth orbit.
Id. art. IV.
I" Article V of the convention does provide that, if a space object is marked with
the designation or registration number discussed in article IV, the launching state
must also notify the Secretary-General of this fact. Id. However, the convention
does not require the object to be marked in such a manner.
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tion's purpose is to aid in the identification of space objects
and the determination of their nationality, its provisions re-
ally only assist in determining nationality for purposes of
jurisdiction.1 2 ' The determination of the identity of the
space object is left to individual states that have the capabil-
ity to monitor and track the objects.1 22 "As a result, identifi-
cation will often depend on the willingness of the state most
likely to face liability to co-operate in the process of
identification."1 23
One of the reasons why the possibility of identification is
not improved under the Registration Convention is that the
convention requires a launching state to provide only a very
limited amount of information. The mandatory orbital in-
formation required under Article IV is not particularly use-
ful for trackable objects, and it has no relation whatsoever
to the problem of space debris.124 A state may provide addi-
tional information concerning its space objects, but this op-
tion is entirely at the individual state's discretion. 25
Probably the most glaring omission of required informa-
tion, in terms of the problem of space debris, is the fact that
launching states are not required to notify the Secretary-
12 BAKER, supra note 4, at 76. The lack of identification capabilities, however,
hampers any attribution of nationality. Id.
,2 Article VI of the convention provides:
Where the application of the provisions of this Convention has not
enabled a State Party to identify a space object which has caused dam-
age to it or to any of its natural or juridical persons, or which may be
of a hazardous or deleterious nature, other State Parties, including in
particular States possessing space monitoring and tracking facilities,
shall respond to the greatest extent feasible to a request by that State
Party, or transmitted through the Secretary-General on its behalf, for
assistance under equitable and reasonable conditions in the identifica-
tion of the object. A State Party making such a request shall, to the
greatest extent feasible, submit information as to the time, nature and
circumstances of the events giving rise to the request. Arrangements
under which such assistance shall be rendered shall be the subject of
agreement between the parties concerned.
Registration Convention, supra note 42, art. VI.
1- BAmtR, supra note 4, at 76.
124 Id. at 77. Baker notes that more useful information would include the orienta-
tion of the orbit, the current or initial position of the object, notice of imminent re-
entry, or notice of changes in the orbit after launch. Id.
125 Registration Convention, supra note 42, art. IV(2).
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General of the breakup or fragmentation of their space ob-
jects. 2 6 Article IV(3) merely provides that each state "shall
notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the
greatest extent feasible and as soon as practicable, of space
objects concerning which it has previously transmitted in-
formation, and which have been but no longer are in earth
orbit." 2 7 This provision might be applicable to situations
involving a satellite breakup but, again, that determination
would depend upon the scope of the term space object.
The Registration Convention, along with the Outer
Space Treaty and the Agreement on the Rescue of Astro-
nauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects
Launched into Outer Space 128 (Return and Rescue Agree-
ment), also has an impact on the determination of whether
debris or other space objects can be removed from orbit by
someone other than the launching state. As stated earlier,
the Outer Space Treaty provides for the retention of juris-
diction and control over an object by the state which regis-
ters the launch of the object.1 2.9 The language of Article
VIII is very clear and leaves little doubt that other states may
not destroy or remove the space object (or component
parts) of another state without permission. 30 The Return
and Rescue Agreement, however, does provide for states to
exercise a limited amount of control over another state's
space object if that object has returned to Earth.1 '
Whether or not one state may exercise any control over
another's space debris is subject to debate. One commenta-
tor has suggested that, if debris is not included within the
definition of space object, then the debris would not be
subject to the continuing registration required by the Regis-
tration Convention and could be removed or eliminated
I- Leinberg, supra note 21, at 105.
Registration Convention, supra note 42, art. IV(3).
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Apr. 22, 1968, 19
U.S.T. 7570 [hereinafter Return and Rescue Agreement].
- Outer Space Treaty, supra note 63, art. VIII.
-s Stamps, supra note 105, at 154.
" Return and Rescue Agreement, supra note 128, art. V(1).
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without fear of repercussions under international law.1 32
Another commentator contends that it is the Return and
Rescue Agreement, not the Registration Convention, which
provides the authority to remove another state's debris. Ar-
ticle V(4) of the agreement provides:
Notwithstanding paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, a Con-
tracting Party which has reason to believe that a space object
or its component parts discovered in territory under its ju-
risdiction, or recovered by it elsewhere, is of a hazardous or deleteri-
ous nature may so notify the launching authority, which shall
immediately take effective steps, under the direction and
control of said Contracting Party, to eliminate possible dan-
ger of harm. 1 33
Stamps argues that, since portions of the Agreement are
specifically limited to the Earth and other portions are not
(because Article V(4) contains no such limiting language),
states may recover the debris of other states because it is
"hazardous or deleterious. " 13 4
These approaches, however, ignore one of the basic
problems of space debris, that of identification. The vast
majority of debris is not attributable to a particular launch-
ing state, and the debris that is identifiable does not present
the greatest hazard. 135 The fact that most debris is unat-
tributable actually makes it easier to remove it because, as
Wirin noted, it would not be covered by any of the interna-
tional treaty problems. 36 The Outer Space Treaty provi-
sions governing jurisdiction and control would not apply
simply because there is no way to know to whom the debris
belonged in the first place. The Registration Convention
132 Wirin, supra note 46, at 50. Wirin had previously stated that, "[iun order to
legally interfere with debris caused by another launching Nation under customary
international law, there is the requirement that the State expressly relinquish owner-
ship and jurisdiction." Wirin, supra note 31, at 187. He goes on to note that the
United States' position is that even a long period of abandonment does not neces-
sarily relinquish a party's rights. Id.
13 Return and Rescue Agreement, supra note 128, art. V(4) (emphases added).
- Stamps, supra note 105, at 155-56.
13 See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text (discussing problems with identi-
fication of debris).
- Wirin, supra note 46, at 49-50.
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provisions would also meet the same fate, as would the Re-
turn and Rescue Agreement provisions.
V. NATIONAL SPACE DEBRIS POLICIES
A. UNITED STATES
1. Generally
Although international law provides some guidance to
the problems'associated with space debris, many of the
spacefaring nations are not waiting for it to provide a defin-
itive answer. The United States, as one of the major space
nations, has taken the lead in addressing the issue. What
began as a hodge-podge of efforts among various agencies
and departments has become a permanent part of United
States space policy.137
2. NASA Policy
The National Aeronautic and Space Administration
(NASA) oversees all U.S. government launches."3 8 Because
of the enormous role it plays in the launch industry, NASA
policy has been tremendously influential in the space deb-
ris area. NASA began to approach the problem of space
debris at the policy level in 1981, when it developed a ten
year plan to address the topic.3 9 The purpose of the plan
was to "define the activities and resources required over the
next ten years to develop the necessary understanding of
the man-made orbital debris environment .... "140 Eventu-
ally, the plan was to lead to the development of interna-
tional space debris agreements. 141 The plan itself was
divided into several major areas, including debris hazard as-
sessment, debris environment assessment, and space object
management. 142
1-1 BAKER, supra note 4, at 111.
138 Id.
- Schwetje, supra note 25, at 168.
140 BAKER, supra note 4, at 112 (citation omitted).
"' Schweje, supra note 25, at 168.
42 Leinberg, supra note 21, at 106.
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At the time, NASA also implemented several policies
designed immediately to impact the creation of orbital deb-
ris. These included: (1) design of objects to reduce the pos-
sibility of breakup; (2) development of the capability to
measure the debris population beyond that currently avail-
able; (3) re-entry of used rocket stages; and (4) assessment
of the impact of space debris on the placement of "either
large structures or a large number of objects in Earth
orbit."143
These same goals are also reflected in a strategy imple-
mented by NASA in 1987. Under this strategy, the agency
utilized computer modeling to help estimate the debris
population and began to design and develop radar capable
of tracking very small debris objects.14" NASA also in-
creased research on materials to reduce the creation of
debris and hastened development of shielding and protec-
tive devices.1 45
NASA has recognized, however, that it cannot resolve the
space debris problem single-handedly. In light of this fact,
it initiated formal discussions with nations that have active
space programs. 14 While these efforts began informally,
several of the entities approached by NASA began to de-
velop policies or established working groups to work with
the United States in reducing space debris.1 47 Because of
NASA's pro-active measures, it has been suggested that the
agency's plan become the basis for international policy. 48
3. Department of Defense
The United States Department of Defense has also been
seriously concerned about the impact that space debris
1- BAKER, supra note 4, at 113.
144 Id.
145 Id.
14 Joseph P. Loftus, Jr. & Andrew E. Potter, United States Studies in Orbital Debris
Prevention and Mitigaion, PRoc. 33D COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 408, 413 (1990).
Informal and/or formal discussions have taken place with the European Space
Agency, Canada, the former Soviet Union, Germany, China, Australia, India, Indo-
nesia, Israel, Italy, Britain, and Brazil. Id.
147 Id. at 414.
'4 BAKER, supra note 4, at 113.
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might have on national security. 14 9 In 1986, the Depart-
ment of Defense initiated a study to ascertain whether the
possible dangers posed by debris were serious enough to
warrant further action. This study found: "[S]pace debris
represents a growing problem whose seriousness depends
on future traffic and debris management. Even with care-
ful control of future debris events, the level of debris ...
will increase through fragmentation collisions of orbiting
objects." 150
The United States Air Force (USAF) Science Advisory
Board, which conducted the study, also issued several rec-
ommendations. 15 1 While not all of these recommendations
were carried out, in March of 1987, then Secretary of De-
fense Caspar Weinberger signed a Department of Defense
Policy Statement which stated: "[Department of Defense]
will seek to minimize the impact of space debris on its mili-
tary operations. Design and operation of [Department of
Defense] space tests, experiments and systems will strive to
minimize or reduce the accumulation of space debris con-
sistent with mission requirements."1 5 2 By issuing this state-
ment, the "United States became the first major Western
space power to recognize the problems posed by space deb-
ris to the use of outer space." 5 3
As a result of this policy statement, the Department of
Defense and the USAF have implemented several programs
1- Schwetje, supra note 25, at 166. "It has been predicted that the Archduke Fran-
cis Ferdinand of World War III may well be a critical U.S. or Soviet satellite hit by a
space junk during a crisis." Id.
150 BAKER, supra note 4, at 115 (quoting SPECIAL REPORT OF THE USAF SCIENTIFIC
BOARD AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON CURRENT AND POTENTIAL TECHNOLOGY TO PROTECT
AIR FORCE SPACE MISSIONS FROM CURRENT AND FUTURE DEBRIS (August 1987)).
151 The Board recommended that uniform design and specification practices be
adopted and that the United States help set up an international commission on
space debris to "encourage cooperative measurements and exchange of data on the
debris environment,... implement agreed upon specifications and design practices
for future space systems, and ... encourage international co-operation in dealing
with hazardous events and warnings of potential collisions." The report also recom-
mended the minimization of the creation of space debris by weapon systems, partic-
ularly by the development of new systems and materials, and continued research.
BAKER, supra note 4, at 115-16.
'52 Leinberg, supra note 21, at 107.
155 McDermott, supra note 16, at 156.
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or policies. They have planned experiments to measure the
amount of debris in Low Earth Orbit and designed tests to
determine the impact the debris has on manned and un-
manned space vehicles. 154 In addition, the Department of
Defense is developing protective shielding for vehicles and
increasing their maneuverability while also designing these
vehicles to avoid the possibility of breakup in a collision. 15
In the view of several commentators, however, the De-
partment of Defense Policy Statement, while a good begin-
ning, was flawed from the start.1 56  The policy did not
provide for the elimination of debris generation, but
merely sought to minimize debris generation consistent
with national security interests.157 Thus, if a mission neces-
sary for national security required the generation of signifi-
cant amounts of debris, the mission would still be
acceptable and consistent with the Department policy.158
In addition, the policy has been criticized because it does
not advocate the elimination of all debris, but only the min-
imization of debris generation. 59
4. Department of Transportation
An increasingly important and expanding area of space
activity is the commercial space launch industry.1 60  The
U.S. government recognized the importance of this indus-
try and began regulating commercial launches through the
- Schweje, supra note 25, at 166.
155 BAKER, supra note 4, at 116-17.
15 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 4, at 116; Leinberg, supra note 21, at 107.
157 Leinberg, supra note 21, at 107.
118 It should be noted that some amount of debris generation is a practical neces-
sity consistent with current space activities. Id.
15 BAKER, supra note 4, at 116. While total elimination of space debris may not be
realistic or even necessary, Baker believes that, "if the objective of research and de-
velopment programmes were elimination of space refuse, the end result would likely
yield greater reductions than those flowing from the more relaxed goal of minimiza-
tion." Id.
- Edward R. Finch, Future Space Commercialization and Space Debris, PROC. 34TH
CoL oQuiuM L OUTER SPACE 168, 169 (1991). The United States, the Arianspace
Group, Japan, France, China, and the former Soviet Union are all competitors in
the space launch industry which was worth an estimated $2 billion to the United
States alone in 1991. Id.
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Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984.161 While the Act
does not specifically refer to space debris, the Office of
Commercial Space Transportation (OCST) apparently has
the authority to require commercial launches to minimize
debris generation. 62 The Commercial Space Launch Act
of 1984 provides:
The Secretary [of Transportation] may, consistent with the
public health and safety, safety of property, and national se-
curity interests and foreign policy interests of the United
States, issue or transfer a license for launching one or more
launch vehicles or for operating one or more launch sites,
or both, to an applicant who meets the requirements for a
license under section 2607 of this title. 163
The language relating to the safety of property, namely,
other space objects, may authorize the OCST to consider
debris generation as a factor in its license review process."
In addition, the OCST may also have the authority to man-
date the minimization of debris generation because debris
may adversely affect the foreign policy or national security
interests of the United States. 165
Generally, an entity must procure a license before it can
launch a vehicle with a payload into orbit.166 The applica-
,61 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2601-2623 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). "No person shall launch
a launch vehicle or operate a launch site within the United States, unless authorized
by a license issued or transferred under this chapter." Id. § 2605 (a) (1). In addi-
tion, no U.S. citizen can launch a vehicle or operate a launch site outside the United
States, regardless of whether it is within the territory of any other nation, without a
license. Id. § 2605(a)(2)-(3).
-6 14 C.F.R. § 401.1 (1993).
165 49 U.S.C. app. § 2606.
16 Pamela L. Meredith, Lgal Implementation of Orbital Debris Mitigation Measures: A
Survey of Options and Approaches, 6 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 203, 210 (1991). In
addition, the Act provides that the Secretary of Transportation, through the OCST,
can "prescribe such additional requirements as are necessary to protect the public
health and safety, safety of property, and national security interests and foreign pol-
icy interests of the United States." 49 U.S.C. app. § 2607(b).
165 BAKER, supra note 4, at 114. Since adherence to international treaties is an
aspect of foreign policy, OCST action could be appropriate if the treaties are appli-
cable to space debris. Id.
14 C.F.R. § 415.3(a) (1993) provides:
The launch of a launch vehicle from U.S. territory by any person, or
from outside U.S. territory by any individual or any corporation, part-
nership, joint venture, association of other entity organized or existing
SPACE DEBRIS
tion review procedure is a two step process consisting of a
safety review and a mission review. 6 7 An application must
include information on:
(1) The launch vehicle stages and its payload, including
evaluations of mission hardware reliability and safety
performance
(2) Mission planning and Expendable Launch Vehicle
(ELV) design
(3) Parking and transfer orbits for spent rocket stages
(4) Evaluations of the orbital life of spent stages and the
probable impacts during reentry
(5) Collision probability with active payloads that could be
jeopardized by the debris of the mission under review
(6) Safety of orbital operations, e.g., venting propellants to
prevent accidental explosions
(7) The types, likelihood, and consequences of on-orbit
failures of ELVs.' 68
In addition to the launch vehicle, the OCST has the author-
ity to regulate some payloads launched by commercial enti-
ties, but certain federal agencies have jurisdiction in
particular instances. 69 The Federal Communication Com-
mission (FCC) is responsible for commercial telecommuni-
cations satellites,1 70  while the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) licenses commercial
remote-sensing satellites. 17'
under the laws of the United States or any state, must be authorized by
a license issued under this part.
'6 14 C.F.R. § 411.3 (1994); see also Wirin, supra note 31, at 187. Because debris
generation is related to mission safety, it falls within the purview of the Office of
Commercial Space Transportation (OCST). Wirin, supra note 31, at 187. Specifi-
cally, the OCST looks at the "ELV staging and maneuvering hardware" for quality
and reliability as well as at the proposed orbit, orbital life, and trajectory of the
vehicle. Id. The application must also include plans on how the vehicle will vent
unused propellants and pressurants in rocket stages left in orbit to prevent explo-
sion. Id.
- Leinberg, supra note 21, at 108.
1-9 14 C.F.R. § 411.7(b) (1994). "A proposal to launch any foreign payload or a
payload not covered by existing FCC or NOAA regulation must be reviewed in con-
sultation with other appropriate Federal agencies. .. ." Id.
00o 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-52 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
1 15 U.S.C, §§ 5621-72 (Supp. V 1993).
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The FCC's regulatory power may be applicable to the
problem of space debris. It has the power to control the
orbital location of each satellite licensee in addition to the
general ability to regulate. 172 By controlling the orbital lo-
cation of a satellite, or requiring the satellite to be moved,
the FCC could require satellites to either be boosted into
disposal orbits or deorbited into controlled reentries at the
end of their useful lives.1 73 This would have the effect of
removing an inactive space object from orbit and prevent-
ing it from colliding with, or being struck by, another space
object, thus reducing the risk of debris generation. How-
ever, "[t]o date, the FCC has not attempted to regulate the
debris aspects of telecommunications satellite operations
.... [by requiring] disposal of satellites at the end of useful
life . . -174
The NOAA, like the FCC, also appears to have the au-
thority to require satellite operators to utilize disposal orbits
at the end of a satellite's useful life. 175 NOAA's regulations
require any licensee to dispose of its satellite in a satisfac-
tory manner.1 76 Once the NOAA determines what would
be a satisfactory manner, it appears that the determination
would have to be approved by the President.1 77
If the FCC or NOAA does not have jurisdiction over the
payload in question, the OCST provisions are applicable.171
Generally, unless the proposed mission or payload repre-
sents a threat to U.S. interests or poses a hazard to public
health and safety, or the safety of property, the mission will
be approved.1 79
- 47 U.S.C. § 303(d) (1988).
'73 Meredith, supra note 164, at 210.
174 Id. at 208. Even though the FCC does not require it, some satellite operators
consistently boost their geostationary satellites into disposal orbits when they are no
longer useful. Id.
17 Id. at 211.
M 15 C.F.R. § 960.11(d) (1995).
1- 15 U.S.C. § 5633(f) (Supp. V. 1993); Meredith, supra note 164, at 212; Wirin,
supra note 31, at 187.
M78 14 C.F.R. § 411.7(b) (1994).
179 Id.
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The solution provided by the OCST provisions is consis-
tent with the Commercial Space Launch Act's congres-
sional findings. 180 The purpose of the Act was to facilitate
the development of the private commercial space indus-
try.181 In accordance with this purpose, the Congress found
U.S. interests would be furthered by "stable, minimal, and
appropriate regulatory guidelines that are fairly and expedi-
tiously applied."1 8 2  This fact would seem to discourage
stringent regulation of commercial launches based on the
amount of debris, within reason, that they might gener-
ate. 183 By applying overly restrictive regulations, the OCST
could place the U.S. commercial space industry at a com-
petitive disadvantage relative to the other world space pow-
ers.' 8 4 This result would not only be inconsistent with the
intentions of the Commercial Space Launch Act, but it
would also be inconsistent with general U.S. space policy. 85
1-0 49 U.S.C. app. § 2601 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
181 Id. § 2602(2).
18 Id. § 2601(6) (emphasis added). In addition, the act states:
[T] he United States should encourage private sector launches and as-
sociated services and, only to the extent necessary, regulate such launches
and services in order to ensure compliance with international obliga-
tions of the United States and to protect the public health and safety,
safety of property, and national security interests and foreign policy
interests of the United States.
Id. § 2601(7) (emphasis added).
1 However, general U.S. policy does indicate a desire to reduce space debris
whenever it does not conflict with another important goal or policy of the United
States. See infra note 186 and accompanying text (discussing President Reagan's Na-
tional Space Policy).
1- Meredith, supra note 164, at 211.
195 President Reagan's National Space Policy, which did discuss minimizing the
creation of space debris, stated that any regulation of the commercial launch indus-
try "must not necessarily prejudice involvement and international competitiveness of
the U.S. commercial space industry." Wirin, supra note 31, at 188. President Bush's
national space policy also acknowledged the importance of the commercial space
industry. It stated:
[E]xpanding private sector investment in space by the market-driven
commercial sector generates economic benefits for the nation and
supports governmental space sectors with an increasing range of space
goods and services. Governmental space sectors shall purchase com-
mercially available space goods and services to the fullest extent feasi-
ble and shall not conduct activities with potential commercial
applications that preclude or deter commercial sector space activities
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5. Overall Policy
The problem of space debris has been addressed, to a
limited extent, at the highest levels of U.S. government. In
January 1988, President Reagan signed a National Space
Policy which provided: "All space sectors will seek to mini-
mize the creation of space debris. Design and operations of
space tests, experiments and systems will strive to minimize
or reduce accumulation of space debris consistent with mis-
sion requirements and cost effectiveness."186 This policy
constituted an important precedent because it was the "first
public statement by the chief executive officer of a major
space power on the subject of space [debris] .-187 The pol-
icy itself was apparently developed from the Department of
Defense policy which had been instituted in 1987.88 How-
ever, while the Department of Defense policy sought to
"minimize the impact of space debris," the National Space
Policy focused on minimizing the "creation of space deb-
ris." Thus, the National Space Policy reflected a greater
commitment to actually curtailing the overall space debris
problem.
This increased commitment was also evident in the estab-
lishment of the Interagency Group (Space) for the National
Security Council. This working group was to provide rec-
ommefidations for a space debris policy and was assigned
five specific tasks:
(1) Define the dimensions of the current and projected
space debris problem
(2) Review existing agency debris policies and activities
(3) Review options for reducing the production of space
debris and minimizing its hazards to spacecraft
(4) Recommend approaches to other governments
Finch, supra note 160, at 169.
- BAKER, supra note 4, at 118 (quoting OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, THE
WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: NATIONAL SPACE POLICY 1 (Jan. 26, 1988)).
187 Id. at 120.
M See supra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing Department of Defense
policy on space debris).
(5) Recommend areas for potential future research regard-
ing debris environment measurement and protection
techniques.18 9
A working group, co-chaired by NASA and Department of
Defense officials, prepared the final report (Interagency
Report) and submitted it in February 1989.190 The Inter-
agency Report made several important findings and recom-
mendations. The group found that, due to the limited
capability to measure the actual debris population, the ur-
gency of action might not be as extreme as had been sug-
gested.1 91 However, the Interagency Report did note that,
unless efforts were made to limit debris generation, space
operations would be jeopardized in the future. 92
The Interagency Report recommended that, consistent
with President Reagan's National Space Policy, all future
space missions should be designed to minimize the creation
of new space debris.193 It also recommended the develop-
ment of research plans by government agencies to address
space debris. 94 NASA and the Department of Defense,
along with the Department of Transportation, developed
these plans which, not surprisingly, paralleled each
agency's previous attitude toward the generation of deb-
ris.' 95 In short, they all agreed that the minimization of
debris generation should be a design consideration for sub-
sequent space activities, although the Department of Trans-
portation was concerned about the possible impact this
189 Leinberg, supra note 21, at 106.
- See INTERAGENCY REPORT, supra note 7.
19, Col. Robert L. Bridge & Lt. Col. Milton L. Smith, Space Debris: A Role for Law-
yers?, PROC. 33D COLt.LOQUiUM L. OUTER SPACE 266 (1990); see also Wirin, supra note
31, at 186.
I" Bridge & Smith, supra note 191, at 266.
193 Id.
- Id. Efforts to study and measure the debris environment are currently under-
way as a result of these plans. See O'Brien, supra note 2 (discussing Satellite Orbital
Debris Characterization Impact Test); Chris Stagg, Cheap Mercury Mirror Puts New
Spin on Star-Gazing, CALGARY HERALD, Aug. 7, 1993, at B6 (discussing NASA's con-
struction of a mercury mirror to increase debris detection capability).
9 Bridge & Smith, supra note 191, at 266.
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might have on the commercial space industry. 9 6 While this
is basically what was mandated by the National Space Policy
of 1988, the research plans prepared by the groups pro-
vided for a cohesive, long-term effort to study the debris
environment and develop debris mitigation capabilities.1 97
B. EUROPE
1. European Space Agency
The European Space Agency (ESA), like the United
States, established a working group to study "all aspects of
space debris which may have a detrimental effect on activi-
ties on ground and in space." 98 This group presented its
report in November 19881" and came to conclusions simi-
lar to those their American counterparts would release
three months later. The ESA Report recognized that, while
space debris was not yet an imminent threat to manned or
unmanned space activities, a "conscious policy aimed at
curbing the growth of debris" must be adopted. 0
One of the primary ways the ESA is seeking to improve
the debris situation is through the development of radar
and telescopic facilities to monitor and measure the debris
environment.0 1 Currently, the United States and the for-
mer Soviet Union are the major sources of information
concerning the debris population. However, work on a Eu-
ropean tracking system is currently underway, 2  and it is
hoped that this work will lead to a significant increase in
the available information concerning space debris.
'9 See supra notes 138-85 and accompanying text (discussing NASA, Department
of Defense, and Department of Transportation policies).
197 Bridge & Smith, supra note 191, at 267; see also BAKER, supra note 4, at 119.
198 BAKER, supra note 4, at 110.
- Space Debris: A Report of the ESA Space Debris Working Group, European Space
Agency, ESA SP 1109 (1988) [hereinafter ESA Report].
200 Wirin, supra note 31, at 188 (quoting ESA Report, supra note 199, at 8).
21 Leinberg, supra note 21, at 109; Wirin, supra note 31, at 188-89.
22 British scientists have completed a study for the ESA which designed a sophisti-
cated telescope to automatically detect and monitor some of the smallest debris frag-
ments. Steve Connor, Scientists Find Way of Detecting Space Junk, THE INDEPENDENT,
June 25, 1993, at 3.
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The European approach to the creation of debris is simi-
lar to that which the United States has taken. The ESA has
begun designing its missions to avoid the probability of a
collision in space that would produce debris and has striven
to use disposal orbits for inactive satellites.2 °3 The ESA also
has plans to shield ESA spacecraft to prevent damage and
debris resulting from collisions20 4 and to alter the design
and operations of its rockets to reduce the chance of
explosions. °
In addition to internal actions, the ESA held the first Eu-
ropean Space Debris Conference in Germany in April
1993.206 This multilateral conference was apparently the
first to involve representatives from the ESA, the Russian
Space Agency, NASA, China, India, and Japan, among
others.20 7 However, no earth-shattering revelations were
announced at the conference. As expected, the conference
concluded that the long-term hazard of space debris
presents a great threat, and that this threat will require pre-
ventive measures to address the situation properly.20 8 The
most significant accomplishments of the conference were
the itemization of the approximately 7100 identifiable
items of space debris and plans by the ESA to hold another
conference in two years.2 °
- Leinberg, supra note 21, at 109. For example, Meteosat-2, a meteorological
satellite, was boosted 87 miles farther out into space from GEO in late 1991 into a
.graveyard orbit" to prevent it from colliding with other space objects. Rolf Soder-
lind, Dead European Satellite Enters "Graveyard Orbit", REUTER NEWSWIRE, Dec. 3, 1991.
2- A European Satellite known as ERECA, which was retrieved by the space shut-
tle Endeavor in June 1993 after 11 months in orbit, was struck at least 30 times by
debris, either natural or man-made. The largest of the impacts left a quarter-inch
dent which could have seriously crippled the spacecraft if the impact had been in a
critical area. Luckily, however, and somewhat ironically, the debris struck an experi-
ment on the craft that was designed to gather data on debris hits. Todd Halvorson,
European Craft Ready for Another Launch, FLA. TODAY, Aug. 19, 1993.
- Leinberg, supra note 21, at 109.
206 International Experts Propose Bilateral Talks to Solve Space Debris Problem, SATELLITE
WEE , Apr. 19, 1993.
- Id. 251 experts from 17 countries attended the conference. Id.
- Id. These preventive measures include venting of unused propellants, disposal
orbits, and orbiting the vehicle so that it will reenter the atmosphere and burn up
when its useful life is finished. Id.
-0 Id. Some feel that a "World Space Agency" would be the best way to secure the
safety and environment of outer space, and the European Space Agency has en-
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2. The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has passed an act similar to the
American Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 which al-
lows licensing of space activities carried out by U.K nation-
als.2 "° Like the U.S. version, the U.K legislation does not
specifically mention space debris.2 11 However, some provi-
sions, such as the one that requires U.K space activities not
to threaten the safety of persons or property or diminish
U.K national security, could arguably apply to space deb-
ris.Y2 While the statute provides that the Secretary of State
has the discretionary power to impose conditions on the
licenses it issues, the statute itself sets out several conditions
which the Secretary should consider, two of which could
apply to space debris. One condition is that an entity seek-
ing a license may be required to prevent contamination of
outer space and to avoid interference with the peaceful ac-
tivities of other users of outer space.213 Another condition
is that the Secretary may require payloads to be disposed of
in any manner he or she sees fit at the end of their useful
life. 14 An example of this would be to require the use of
disposal orbits for satellites.
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
While space debris may not pose the immediate danger
some believe, it is sufficiently problematic that the world
community must address it in some manner. Most of the
major space powers have acknowledged this and have be-
dorsed such an idea. Barbara Wood-Kaczmar, Spring Cleaning: The Nations that Clutter
the Heavens are Finally Uniting, THE GuARDIAN, Apr. 22, 1993, at 13.
210 An Act to Confer Licensing and Other Powers on the Secretary of State to
Secure Compliance with the International Obligations of the United Kingdom with
respect to the Launching and Operation of Space Objects and the Carrying On of
Other Activities in Outer Space by Persons Connected with this Country, reprinted in
11 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 412 (1986) [hereinafter Outer Space Act].
211 BAKER, supra note 4, at 120.
212 Id.
213 Outer Space Act, supra note 210, §§ 5(2)(e)(i), (ii).
214 Id. § 5(2)(g).
gun taking steps to ameliorate the situation. However,
there is no coordinated approach to minimizing space deb-
ris. This results in duplicated efforts and inefficient solu-
tions. To develop a coordinated approach, the world
community must make several decisions concerning this
undertaking.
A. APPROPRiATE FORUM
The world community must decide on an appropriate fo-
rum for this issue. Some believe that the proper forum is
the United Nations, while others suggest that multilateral
or bilateral agreements would be more appropriate. Each
approach has distinct advantages and disadvantages, and
the following discussion will examine these aspects.
1. Worldwide Organization/United Nations
Because space debris is a multinational problem, some
commentators feel that the only way to solve it is through a
worldwide international convention negotiated through the
United Nations or other similar international organiza-
tions.215 It has been argued that, since outer space is the
common heritage of all mankind, all countries have a right
to determine the policies and objectives of any organization
affecting outer space regardless of their level of involve-
ment in space. 216 To achieve this objective, authorities
maintain that the United Nations Committee on the Peace-
ful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) would be an appro-
priate forum because it is fully representative of the world
community.2 17
UNCOPUOS is a body devoted to various outer space is-
sues with representatives from a broad range of nationali-
ties and viewpoints. Its advocates propose that the
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of UNCOPUOS
25 See, e.g., Finch, supra note 160, at 168.
216 BAKER, supra note 4, at 159.
217 Leinberg, supra note 21, at 110. UNCOPUOS has two subcommittees which
could assist in the effort. These are the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee and
the Legal Subcommittee.
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could first lay the technical foundation that would then be
acted upon by the Legal Subcommittee.2 18 UNCOPUOS
has developed several general and specialized treaties and
has recommended certain guidelines for states in their
space activities. 19
Any agreement adopted through UNCOPUOS would be
guaranteed to be approved by all of the space powers and a
large group of other states.22 0  However, UNCOPUOS
achievements have only come after "years of preparatory
study and painstaking negotiations before a final product
could emerge from the committee's consensus proce-
dure."2 2 1 Because of the procedure used by UNCOPUOS, it
can take nearly a decade before anything results from the
committee's work.2 In addition, the committee is subject
to the political whims of its members, who sometimes disre-
gard meritorious proposals because they were initiated by a
political opponent or because of some reason completely
218 Hobe, supra note 67, at 198.
219 Stephen E. Doyle, Regulating Space Debris: What Can Be Done About It?, PROC. 33D
COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 421 (1990).
220 Jfirgen Reifarth, An Appropriate Legal Format for the Discussion of the Problem of
Space Debris, in ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF ACTIVITIES IN OUTER SPACE, supra note
107, at 301, 305. UNCOPUOS has a total of 53 members. Id. This fact can also be a
disadvantage since many of the states on the committee are not involved in space
activities, with the result that irrelevant arguments are at times brought forth. Id. at
307. These arguments must be addressed and explained to the delegations, which
must then discuss them with their national authorities and return with an answer the
following year. Id.
-1 Doyle, supra note 219, at 421. UNCOPUOS requires unanimity in its decision
making process, which can lead to long delays. Reifarth, supra note 220, at 306.
222 Reifarth, supra note 220, at 306. It took UNCOPUOS almost 10 years each to
settle principles regarding direct broadcasting and remote sensing. Id. In addition,
Reifarth provides an excellent illustration of the political gamesmanship which per-
meates UNCOPUOS. He states:
This unwieldiness was again revealed impressively at the most recent
Legal Subcommittee meeting in spring 1988, when consensus was
reached only on the principle of "Applicability of International Law,"
which includes only well-established and self-evident provisions. Other
delegations proposed additional principles which do not contain any
novel aspects either. As some delegations consider it expedient to
adopt only the principle per year, even well-meant proposals come to
nothing. Technical issues are thus in danger of being lost in the tac-
tics oriented discussion within the United Natons.
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unrelated to the relevant issue. 2 3 While UNCOPUOS has
contemplated putting space debris on its agenda, it has not
done so because of the problems associated with defining
the scope of the issue and the reluctance of some UN-
COPUOS members.22 4
Another proposed forum for discussing space debris is
the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) .225
Although the ITU's jurisdiction is generally limited to tele-
communications systems and satellites, it does have access
to some of the best scientists, engineers, and specialists who
would be able to address the highly technical issues
quickly. 26 Its structural framework lends itself to the devel-
opment of international regulations through "disciplined
and thoughtful" practices. 227 In addition, as a specialized
arm of the United Nations, the ITU already has the needed
procedures and practices in place to produce effective regu-
lation.228 Nonetheless, while the ITU could address space
debris because of its possible impact on space telecommuni-
cations, it is not likely to consider the problem in the near
future. 229
2. Multilateral/Bilateral Negotiations
While proceeding through the United Nations structure
would have the advantage of representation by a large
number of states, this fact is also a disadvantage in some
instances. The interests of industrialized nations often
compete or conflict with those of less developed nations,
particularly in the area of environmental regulation.2 "°
Thus, participation by all, or even a large number of states
could result in needless waste and delay.23 Regardless of
- Id.
-4 Doyle, supra note 219, at 422; see also Wirin, supra note 31, at 195.
- Doyle, supra note 219, at 421; BAKER, supra note 4, at 159.




230 Lampertius, supra note 5, at 467.
-1 See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text (discussing problems with
UNCOPUOS).
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the delay, participation by all states may not even be neces-
sary. The greatest threat posed by space debris is to other
objects in space, not to activities on the Earth's surface.3 2
Some believe that "[o] nly those states which are involved in
space activities can take an action to contain the production
of space debris, and only those states can suffer from dam-
age to space objects caused by debris."2 33
An alternative approach to United Nations action would
be to conduct multilateral discussions or negotiations
among the active space nations.2 4 This approach would
have the advantage of involving only knowledgeable states
who have a vested interest in concentrating only on the
debris problem and not being sidetracked by tangential is-
sues. 2 35 In addition, many of the space capable nations are
already following practices to lessen the amount of debris
generated and the impact that debris has on the environ-
ment.236 Because of this, it should not be particularly diffi-
cult to reach agreement on accepted policies and
practices.237 Once an agreement is reached, whether it be
2-2 Reifarth, supra note 220, at 308. It should be remembered, 'however, that
space debris can also interfere with scientific and communications activities based
on the Earth's surface. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text (discussing
possible interference caused by space debris).
25 Reifarth, supra note 220, at 308.
2- Lampertius, supra note 5, at 468; Leinberg, supra note 21, at 110; McDermott,
supra note 16, at 158; Stamps, supra note 105, at 153; Wirin, supra note 31, at 195.
235 Lampertius, supra note 5, at 467. "Such discussions would have the benefit of
eliminating those nations without the capability to launch and thereby eliminate the
chance that the discussions may 'becom[e] the subject of acrimonious debate in
which technical issues and solutions could be lost.' " McDermott, supra note 16, at
158 (quoting U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Orbiting Debris: A
Space Environmental Problem-Background Paper, Sept. 1990, at 36).
2 See, e.g., Bridge & Smith, supra note 191, at 268. Bridge and Smith actually feel
that the current approach to space debris is adequate because of the actions of the
United States and those of the ESA, Russia, and Japan. Id.
237 However, there are no guarantees of a speedy agreement among the space
nations. For example, it required more than two years to reach an agreement on an
international space station involving the European Space Agency, the United States,
Japan, and Canada. Lampertius, supra note 5, at 468.
bilateral or multilateral,238 it can be used as the basis for
future United Nations action.23 9
For these reasons, it is advantageous to pursue multilat-
eral negotiations and discussions rather than action
through an existing organization. While the debris situa-
tion is not as desperate as some believe,24 it still needs to be
addressed. By gathering a group focused solely on the issue
of space debris, the world community can ameliorate any
further damage to the space environment and reduce the
future costs to society. Spacefaring nations have already be-
gun discussions, and these negotiations should continue
with the goal of an international agreement firmly in mind.
B. CoNTENT OF AGREEMENT
Regardless of how the world community reaches an
agreement or what form it takes, there are certain areas it
must address. Any agreement must clearly define the terms
that will be used for the space debris problem. It also needs
to increase the information available concerning debris and
to disseminate this information to all concerned. In addi-
tion, the agreement must develop preventive measures to
curtail debris generation, along with practices to remove
the debris that is currently in orbit. Finally, any new agree-
ment should expand on the liability provisions contained in
the Liability Convention.
1. Definitions
To 'adequately address the problem of space debris,
spacefaring nations must develop an acceptable definition
of debris.241 Any future agreement must precisely define its
terminology, unlike the current space law agreements, "in
2 A multilateral approach may be preferable to avoid duplicative and inconsis-
tent approaches. Id. It should be noted that the spacefaring nations have already
participated in a conference to discuss the space debris issue, although no interna-
tional agreement was pursued or achieved. See supra notes 206-09 and accompany-
ing text (discussing European Space Agency's 1993 conference on space debris).
2- Leinberg, supra note 21, at 110; Reifarth, supra note 220, at 308.
240 Bridge & Smith, supra note 191, at 268.
241 Wirin, supra note 46, at 50.
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order to ensure that provisions are not easily disputed and
the standards can be easily understood."242 Currently, it is
unclear whether the term space object, as used by the space
law agreements, encompasses space debris. 43
To determine if an object is debris, some commentators
focus on whether or not it is "valueless, "24 while others look
to see whether the object is still under control of the
launching authority.245 Yet another possible approach is to
develop a laundry list of what is or is not debris.246 The
manner in which debris is defined will have an impact not
only on any future agreement, but also on the current
space law treaties. If debris is not within the scope of the
term space object, then the provisions of the Registration
Convention and the Liability Convention would not
apply.2 47
Clearly, removing debris from the scope of the Outer
Space Treaty and Registration and Liability Conventions
could have several positive effects if done in conjunction
with the development of an intelligible set of guidelines
concerning debris. First, such removal would do away with
the contradictory and confusing arguments put forth by
commentators. This is important because no strictly judi-
cial or legal pronouncement is forthcoming, nor is a con-
sensus among the commentators likely. Second, the
existing international outer space agreements were clearly
not intended to address the problem of space debris. By
2a McDermott, supra note 16, at 158.
243 See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text (discussing the term "space ob-
ject" as used in the space law agreements).
244 BAKER, supra note 4, at 156. Baker defines space debris as "those man-made
objects in outer space deemed to be valueless, as evidenced by an absence of opera-
tional control, and includ[ing] inactive payloads, operational debris, fragmentation
debris and microparticulate matter." Id.
245 Fasan, supra note 50, at 282; Gorove, supra note 55, at 97.
24 Kopal, supra note 42, at 41.
247 See supra note 98 and text accompanying note 132 (discussing the definition of
debris and its effect on the Liability Convention, and the removal of debris if it is not
included within the definition of space object under the Registration Convention).
Removing debris from the aegis of these instruments would have a significant im-
pact on the jurisdiction and control over the object and any liability system for dam-
age by debris.
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attempting to shoehorn debris into instruments that were
not designed to meet this very specific and technical need,
commentators have diverted attention from what is truly
needed: a specific agreement on debris. By attempting to
shoehorn debris into instruments that were not designed to
meet this very specific and technical need, commentators
have diverted attention from what is truly needed: a specific
agreement on debris.
It appears that a good approach is to define space debris
as man-made objects, including former space objects, that,
through natural processes, are no longer under the control
of the registering entity and that serve no useful purpose.
This definition would have the effect of limiting space ob-
jects to currently functioning objects while opening the
debris category to formerly operational, yet still intact, satel-
lites in addition to the traditional idea of debris. As debris,
these objects would no longer be subject to the continuing
jurisdiction and control of the launching entity as contem-
plated by the Outer Space Treaty and Registration Conven-
tion. Although satellite owners might fear the loss of the
satellite after the end of its useful life, this definition would
provide an incentive to arrange for the proper disposal of
the satellite. 48 If the owner had not done so, then it could
not complain about the later removal of the debris.
2. Available Information
Once the international community decides what consti-
tutes debris, it must develop better means of measuring the
debris population. 49 Currently, there is no international
system for obtaining and evaluating information on tracka-
2 The requirement that loss of control of the object occur through natural
processes would curtail any wrongdoing in the form of states pirating other nations'
space objects.
2- Felske, supra note 35, at 419; Leinberg, supra note 21, at 100; Lubos Perek,
Technical Aspects of the Control of Space Debris, PROC. 33D CoLLoQuIuM L. OUTER SPACE
400, 405 (1990); David E. Reibel, Prevention of Orbital Debris, PROC. 30TH CoLLO-
QUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 147, 152 (1987); Tatsuzawa, supra note 50, at 174.
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ble objects,25 ° and the capability to track very small pieces of
debris is extremely limited. 5 ' One commentator proposed
that tracking improvements could come from enhanced
ground-based radar or from a series of space debris moni-
toring posts shared by the spacefaring nations.252 Although
individual nations are pursuing increased tracking capabili-
ties, the costs of these are enormous.2 5 If the spacefaring
nations shared the costs of these projects, then they could
achieve greater progress with less duplication of efforts. In
addition, they could develop improved systems in a shorter
period of time which would then allow the nations to
devote their resources to reducing the amount of debris in-
stead of just measuring it.
To be effective, the spacefaring nations must share and
distribute this information amongst themselves and the
world community. This could be accomplished through
the register maintained by the U.N. Secretary-General2 54 or
through some entity currently not in existence. While
some commentators believe the space debris problem
needs a separate system or management organization,255
the current U.N. register would probably be adequate if
given sufficient information. The register would have to be
updated rapidly as the nations gather more information,
and all nations involved in space must participate com-
pletely if efforts to reduce debris are to prove successful.
3. Preventive Measures
Because the true extent and nature of the space debris
problem is not known, it is impossible to state precisely
what actions will prove most effective in remedying the de-
2- Perek, supra note 249, at 405. Most of the information about the debris popu-
lation comes from U.S. facilities. Id.
25, Leinberg, supra note 21, at 110.
252 Id.
255 Id.; see also supra notes 190-97, 210-14 and accompanying text (discussing U.S.
and U.K efforts to improve detection capabilities).
2 See supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing the Secretary-General's
master registry).
255 See, e.g., Tatsuzawa, supra note 50, at 174.
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bris situation. Spacefaring nations, however, can take many
actions that would be helpful in limiting the future amount
of debris generated and even reducing the current debris
population. The following is a list of some well-accepted
ideas to reduce debris:
1. Design spacecraft to reduce the possibility of explosions
or fragmentation upon collision, including shielding.256
2. Vent unused fuel or propellants to reduce the chance of
unintentional explosions.
3. Utilize parking and transfer orbits for planned reentry of
objects into the atmosphere.258
4. Utilize graveyard orbits for satellites at the end of their
useful life in GEO. This would require saving enough fuel
to accomplish the transfer.259
5. Redesign space objects to meet more than one need si-
multaneously, thus reducing the number of objects in
orbit.26 o
6. Evaluate planned missions using the amount of debris
they might generate as a major criteria.261
7. Increase the maneuverability of spacecraft so they can
avoid collisions. 62
8. Initiate retrieval of debris or inactive satellites, by spe-
cially designed spacecraft.265
9. Select orbital parameters and launch windows to mini-
mize the chance of collision.t 4
2 See, e.g. BAKER, supra note 4, at 158. Although it should be easy to gain accept-
ance for design regulations, new and emerging space powers might object to some
of the more costly requirements. Leinberg, supra note 21, at 111. To alleviate this
problem, economic or technical assistance should be available to those countries.
257 See, e.g., Felske, supra note 35, at 419.
258 See, e.g., Stamps, supra note 105, at 158.
2- See, e.g., Leinberg, supra note 21, at 113.
2w See, e.g., Tatsuzawa, supra note 50, at 174.
261 See, e.g., Perek, supra note 249, at 403.
-2 See, e.g., Leinberg, supra note 21, at 111-12. Current spacecraft maneuverabil-
ity, however, in most instances is not very cost or mission effective. Id.; Felske, supra
note 35, at 419.
263 See, e.g., Perek, supra note 249, at 404-05. In most instances, the commentators
who argued that actual removal of debris was not economically or technologically
feasible were correct. However, new developments may affect the assessment. F-r
example, the Japanese National Space Development Agency is developing a satellite
capable of removing very small debris particles. COMMUNICATION DILv, Sept. 10,
1993, at 7.
2 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 4, at 158.
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While this is by no means an all-inclusive list, it does high-
light the most important and accepted techniques of deal-
ing with the space debris issue. As with any endeavor, each
item has advantages and disadvantages. But if mankind
wishes to continue to utilize outer space, the world commu-
nity must take steps to limit the amount of debris it
generates.
4. Liability Provisions
If space debris does fall within the definition of space ob-
ject, then spacefaring nations will have a difficult time ac-
counting for losses under the Liability Convention. The
convention is seriously hampered by the lack of a defined
standard of care or fault, and it is probably fatally flawed by
difficulties associated with identifying and proving causa-
tion.2 65 This is one reason why any agreement should de-
fine space debris so that it does not fall within the meaning
of space object.
If the spacefaring nations do not improve their debris
identification capabilities, then any liability system which
they might develop would be ineffective. If they retain the
current fault based liability standard, then it will be nearly
impossible to identify who is responsible for the debris.
This same problem, however, would exist under an absolute
liability standard.2 66 Although a party would not be re-
quired to prove the fault of the other party, it would still
have to prove its identity. Until the detection and tracking
capabilities improve sufficiently, the world community
should transfer the risk of loss to the space community as a
whole. 67 This could be done by setting up a fund, with
contributions from all launching states based on their
number of launches. Any damage caused by debris could
then be at least partially compensated.
See supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text (discussing problems with the
Liability Convention).
- See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text (discussing absolute liability as a
standard of care).
-t Once the tracking capabilities have sufficiently improved, an absolute liability
standard would be appropriate.
VII. CONCLUSION
Space debris is a very serious threat to mankind's contin-
ued exploration of the area around our planet. While it is
not as grave nor immediate a problem as some suggest, if
left unchecked it will significantly increase both the cost
and technical complexities associated with space explora-
tion. The existing international legal regime is clearly inad-
equate to address the problem; therefore, a new
international agreement is needed.
Although an international treaty could provide a solu-
tion, a multilateral approach is more realistic and flexible.
Currently, the space nations are beginning to address the
problem on the multinational level, and these efforts
should continue and expand. The final agreement should
provide guidelines on defining space debris, improving
tracking and detection capabilities, improving the dissemi-
nation of information, defining an acceptable standard of
care for liability, and developing preventive measures to re-
duce the accumulation of debris. By addressing these ar-
eas, the space nations will help ensure that future
generations will be able to take advantage of opportunities
in space.
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